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Abstract: A balanced game satises the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its
core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik
(1972)) satisfy the CoMa-property.
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1 Introduction
A balanced game satises the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are
marginal vectors. Hence, the core of a game that satises the CoMa-property is the convex hull
of the marginal vectors that are in the core.
A well-known class of games that satisfy the CoMa-property is the class of convex games:
the core of a convex game is the convex hull of all marginal vectors (cf. Shapley (1971) and
Ichiishi (1981)). A non-convex class of games that satisfy the CoMa-property is the class of
information games (cf. Kuipers (1993)), which is a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree
games (cf. Granot and Huberman (1981)). In this note we prove that assignment games (cf.
Shapley and Shubik (1972)) satisfy the CoMa-property.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some game theoretic notions and introduce the CoMa-property.
A cooperative game with transferable utilities is a pair (P; v) where P is a nite set of
players and v : 2P ! IR is a map that assigns to each S 2 2P a real number v(S), such that
v(;) = 0. Here, 2P is the collection of all subsets (coalitions) of P .
Assignment games, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972), arise from bipartite matching
situations. LetM andN be two disjoint sets. For each i 2 M and j 2 N the value of a matched
pair (i; j) is aij ¸ 0. From this situation an assignment game is dened in the following way.
On the player set M [ N , the worth of coalition S [ T , S µ M; T µ N is dened to be the
maximum that S [ T can achieve by making suitable pairs from its members. If S = ; or
T = ; no suitable pairs can be made and therefore the worth in this situation is 0. Formally, an
assignment game (M [ N; w) is dened by
w(S [ T ) := maxf X
(i;j)2¹
aijj¹ 2 M(S; T )g for all S µ M; T µ N ,
where M(S; T ) denotes the set of matchings between S and T . A matching ¹ 2 M(S; T ) is
called optimal for S [ T ifP(i;j)2¹ aij = w(S [ T ).
The core of a game (P; v) consists of all vectors that distribute the gains v(P ) among the
players in P in such a way that no subset of players can be better off by seceding from the rest
of the players and act on their own behalf. Formally, the core of a game (P; v) is dened by
Core(P; v) := fx 2 IRP jx(S) ¸ v(S) for all S ½ P and x(P ) = v(P )g;
where x(S) :=
P
i2S xi. A game is balanced if and only if its core is non-empty (cf. Bondareva
(1963) and Shapley (1967)). Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that assignment games are
balanced. A core allocation x 2 Core(M [ N; w) of an assignment game (M [ N; w) will
sometimes, for convenience, be denoted by (u; v) 2 IRM £ IRN , where u and v are the vectors
that correspond to the payoffs of the players inM and N , respectively.
Let (P; v) be a game. Let ¦(P ) be the set of all orderings of P , i.e., bijections ¼ : P !
f1; : : : ; jP jg. For ¼ 2 ¦(P ), the marginal vectorm¼(v) is dened by
m¼i (v) := v(fj 2 P j¼(j) · ¼(i)g) ¡ v(fj 2 P j¼(j) < ¼(i)g) for all i 2 P .
3
Now, we are able to dene the CoMa-property for a balanced game. A balanced game (P; v)
satises the Core is convex hull of Marginals (CoMa-) property if
Core(P; v) = convfm¼(v)j¼ 2 ¦(P ) andm¼(v) 2 Core(P; v)g:
3 The CoMa-property for assignment games
The main result of the note is formulated in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 we need some lemmas.
Let (M [ N; w) be an assignment game. The following lemma, due to Shapley and Shubik
(1972), gives a set of conditions that is necessary and sufcient for an allocation to be in the
core.
Lemma 3.2 Let (M [N; w) be an assignment game and let ¹ be an optimal matching between
M andN . Let x = (u; v) 2 IRM £ IRN . Then, x 2 Core(M [N; w) if and only if the following
four conditions are satised:
(i) ui + vj = aij for all (i; j) 2 ¹;
(ii) ui + vj ¸ aij for all i 2 M; j 2 N; and (i; j) 62 ¹;
(iii) xk = 0 for all unmatched players k;
(iv) xk ¸ 0 for all matched players k.
Let (M [ N; w) be an assignment game. Let ¹ be an optimal matching betweenM and N .
Given a core allocation (u; v) 2 Core(M [ N; w), in the tight graph Gw(u; v) = (V; E), the
set of vertices V equals the player set M [ N and the edge set is dened by E := ffi; jgji 2
M; j 2 N; and ui + vj = aijg. In a tight graph we distinguish between two types of edges with
respect to ¹. All edges corresponding to ¹ are referred to as thick edges and all other edges are
referred to as thin edges. Given a component of a tight graph we can construct a tree1 that is a
subgraph of the component, covers all vertices of the component, and contains all thick edges
in the component. Such a tree we call a tight tree. Notice that a tight tree need not be uniquely
determined by the tight graph. The following lemma establishes a relation between the extreme
points of the core of an assignment game and the components of the corresponding tight graph.
Lemma 3.3 Let (M [N; w) be an assignment game and let ¹ be an optimal matching between
M and N . Let (u; v) 2 Core(M [ N; w). Then, (u; v) 2 extfCore(M [ N; w)g if and only
if each component of the tight graph Gw(u; v) contains at least one player with payoff equal to
zero.
Proof. First we show the ‘only if’-part. Let (u; v) 2 Core(M [N; w) and let C be a component
of Gw(u; v) in which the players are S [ T (S µ M; T µ N ). Suppose that the restriction of
1A tree is a connected graph without circuits.
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(u; v) to (S; T ), denoted by (u; v)jS[T , has only positive elements. Then, by Lemma 3.2(iii),
all players in S [ T are matched by ¹. By denition of a component, all players in S [ T
are matched within S [ T . Hence, jSj = jT j. Then, by Lemma 3.2(i)-(iv), we have that for
sufciently small ² > 0 the vectors y; z 2 IRM £ IRN dened by yi := ui + ², zi := ui ¡ ²
for i 2 S; yj := vj ¡ ²; zj := vj + ² for j 2 T ; yl := xl =: zl for l 2 (M [ N)n(S [ T ),




z = x = (u; v) this implies that (u; v) 62
extfCore(M [ N; w)g, proving the ‘only if’-part.
To prove the ‘if’-part, we assume that each component of the tight graph Gw(u; v) contains
at least one player with payoff equal to zero. It is sufcient to show that the system
u(S) + v(T ) ¸ w(S [ T ) for all S µ M; T µ N
contains jM j + jN j tight equations that are linearly independent. Let C1; C2; : : : ; Ck be the
components of the tight graph Gw(u; v). Let P (Cl) be the set of players corresponding to Cl
for all l = 1; : : : ; k. Each component Cl contains a tight tree. Then the system of equations
generated by the edges of such a tree is a linearly independent system (cf. Chvátal (1983)).
Hence, we have Pkl=1(jP (Cl)j ¡ 1) linearly independent tight equations. Combining these
equations with the tight equations generated by the players with zero payoff we obtain a system
ofPkl=1(jP (Cl)j) = jM j + jN j linearly independent equations. 2
The following lemma provides the worth of some specic (r ¡ s)-path coalitions. For two
players r; s 2 P , r 6= s, that are in the same tight tree, an (r ¡ s)-path coalition consists of all
players that are contained in the unique path between r and s, including r and s.
Lemma 3.4 Let (u; v) be an extreme point of the core of an assignment game (M [ N; w) and
let ¹ be an optimal matching between M and N . Suppose S is an (r ¡ s)-path coalition in a
tight tree of Gw(u; v) for which vertex r corresponds to a player that has a payoff equal to zero





Proof. Let º be the matching between S \ M and S \ N that 1) covers S if jSj is even and
Snfrg if jSj is odd and 2) only consists of pairs that correspond to edges in the (r ¡ s)-path.
Then from the denition of º, the equalities ui + vj = aij (for all (i; j) 2 º), and the fact that
















On the other hand, since (u; v) is a core allocation, the reverse inequality of (2) holds, providing
the desired equality. 2
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Now, we can prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that if a game arises from another game by adding null play-
ers only, then the ‘larger’ game satises the CoMa-property if and only if the ‘smaller’ one
does. This assertion immediately follows from the well-known fact that the core of the larger
game arises by adding 0 components for the null players to any core element of the smaller one.
Therefore, we may restrict attention to assignment games (M [ N; w) with jM j = jN j.
Let (M [N; w) be an assignment game with jM j = jN j. Take x = (u; v) 2 extfCore(M [
N; w)g. We have to show that there exists some ordering ¼ of the player set M [ N such that
the corresponding marginal vector m¼(w) coincides with (u; v). The proof consists of three
parts. Let ¹ be an optimal matching between M and N that matches all players in M [ N .
Let C1; C2; : : : ; Ck be the components of the tight graph Gw(u; v) and let P (Cl) be the set of
players corresponding to Cl for all l = 1; : : : ; k.
Claim 1. Let S µ M [ N . If x(S \ P (Cl)) = w(S \ P (Cl)) for all l = 1; : : : ; k, then
x(S) = w(S).
Proof. Note that
x(S) = x(S \ P (C1)) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + x(S \ P (Ck))
= w(S \ P (C1)) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + w(S \ P (Ck))
· w(S);
where the second equality follows from the assumption and the inequality from the fact that the
merger of optimal matchings for S \ P (C1); S \ P (C2); : : : ; S \ P (Ck) gives a matching for
S. On the other hand, since x 2 Core(M [ N; w), we have that x(S) ¸ w(S). We conclude
that x(S) = w(S).2
For a component Cl, a tight sequence ; = Sl0 ½ Sl1 ½ Sl2 ½ ¢ ¢ ¢ ½ SljP (Cl)j = P (Cl) is
a strictly increasing sequence of coalitions with x(Slj) = w(Slj) for all j = 1; : : : ; jP (Cl)j.
Clearly, jSljnSlj¡1j = 1 for all j = 1; : : : ; jP (Cl)j.
Claim 2. Suppose that for every component Cl there is a tight sequence ; 6= Sl1 ½ Sl2 ½
¢ ¢ ¢ ½ SljP (Cl)j = P (Cl). Dene ¼ : M [ N ! f1; : : : ; jM j + jN jg by ¼(i) :=
Pq
l=1 jP (Cl)j + j
if fig = Sq+1j nSq+1j¡1 for 0 · q · k ¡ 1 and 1 · j · jP (Cq+1)j. Then,m¼(w) = x.
Proof. Let Sj be the set of the rst j players inM [ N with respect to the ordering ¼, i.e.,
Sj := fi 2 M [ N j¼(i) · jg:
From the denition of tight sequence and Claim 1 it follows that x(Sj) = w(Sj) for all j =
1; : : : ; jM j + jN j. Now, take i 2 M [ N . Then,
m¼i (w) = w(S¼(i)) ¡ w(S¼(i)¡1)
= x(S¼(i)) ¡ x(S¼(i)¡1)
= xi;
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where the rst equality follows from the denition of a marginal vector and the second equality
from x(Sj) = w(Sj) for all j = 1; : : : ; jM j + jN j. Hence,m¼(w) = x. 2
The theorem now follows from Claim 2 and Claim 3.
Claim 3. For every component Cl there is a tight sequence ; 6= Sl1 ½ Sl2 ½ ¢ ¢ ¢ ½ SljP (Cl)j =
P (Cl).
Proof. Let Tl be a tight tree of the component Cl. Since ¹ matches all players, it follows from
the denition of a component that the vertices of Cl, and hence the vertices of Tl, form a set of
matched pairs (i; j) 2 ¹. Lemma 3.3 implies that there exists a vertex r in the tight tree Tl the
payoff of which is 0. We take such a vertex r and we call it the root of the tree Tl. Now Tl is
a rooted tree, i.e., a tree with a distinguished vertex – the root. Clearly, the root r determines a
direction of the edges as follows. An edge fa; bg in the rooted tree Tl is directed from vertex a
to vertex b if a is on the unique path from r to b. The directed rooted tree Tl with root r is called
r-tree.
Next, we label the vertices in the r-tree Tl by 1; 2; :::; jP (Cl)j via the following procedure.
STEP 1: Give vertex r label 1. Set a := r and t := 1.
STEP 2:
(i) If there exists a thin edge that connects a with an unlabeled vertex b, then give vertex b label
t + 1, set t := t + 1 and a := b, and go to Step 3. Otherwise go to (ii).
(ii) If there exists a thick edge that connects a with an unlabeled vertex b, then give vertex b
label t + 1, set t := t + 1 and a := b, and go to Step 3. Otherwise, scan vertex a, let b be the
predecessor of a in the rooted tree Tl, set a := b, and go to (i).
STEP 3: If t = jP (Cl)j, then STOP. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Note that in every visit of Step 2 we either label or scan a vertex. Since every vertex gets
labeled and scanned only once (except for the root and the vertex labeled last, which do not get
scanned), the procedure ends after at most 2jP (Cl)j ¡ 3 visits of Step 2. Let Slj be the set of the
rst j labeled players in the procedure. Clearly, ; 6= Sl1 ½ Sl2 ½ ¢ ¢ ¢ ½ SljP (Cl)j = P (Cl). So,
we are done if we prove that
w(Slj) = x(S
l
j) for all j = 1; : : : ; jP (Cl)j: (3)
Let player m be the player that is labeled last in Slj. Coalition Slj can be partitioned in Slj(1)
and Slj(2), where Slj(1) is the set of players on the unique path from r tom and Slj(2) is the set




Obviously, the proof is completed if Slj(2) = ;. Hence, we may assume that Slj(2) 6= ;.
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We now show that ¹ matches every player in Slj(2) with another player in Slj(2). Let a 2
Slj(1) and let b 2 Slj(2) be such that (a; b) is an edge in the r-tree. Consider now the edge (a; b)
and the path from a tom. Since vertex b is visited beforem is visited, it follows from Step 2(i)
of the procedure that (a; b) is a thin edge. Since ¹matches all players, it follows that ¹matches




since an optimal matching for Slj(2) is provided by the thick edges in Slj(2). Now, we have
w(Slj) ¸ w(Slj(1)) + w(Slj(2))





where the rst inequality holds since the merger of optimal matchings of Slj(1) and Slj(2) gives
a matching for Slj , the rst equality holds by (4) and (5), the second equality since Slj(1) and
Slj(2) form a partition of Slj and the second inequality holds since x is in the core of the assign-
ment game. Equality (6) implies (3), completing the proof of both Claim 3 and Theorem 3.1. 2
2
The following example illustrates the outcome of the procedure used in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1 and shows that an extreme point of the core could be generated by several marginal
vectors.
Example 3.5 Let (M [ N; w) be the assignment game dened by M := f1; 3; 5; 7; 9; 11g,
N := f2; 4; 6; 8; 10; 12g, and w(fi; jg) := 1 if fi; jg is an edge in the graph depicted in Figure
3.1 and 0 otherwise. Here, the number in a vertex denotes the corresponding player. The
allocation x = (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1) is an extreme point of the core of the assignment
game (M [ N; w). For both components of the tight graph Gw(u; v), a tight tree is depicted in
Figure 1.
The labeling procedure, starting in the vertices 1 and 9, can give the orders
® := (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)
¯ := (1; 6; 7; 2; 3; 4; 5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)
° := (9; 10; 11; 12; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8)
± := (9; 10; 11; 12; 1; 6; 7; 2; 3; 4; 5; 8)










Figure 1: Two tight trees of the components of Gw(x)
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